I am a PhD Candidate in Economics at UCLA. My research interests are in industrial organization and applied microeconomics.

Prior to the PhD, I received my MPA from the London School of Economics and worked for several years in economic consulting and then as a consultant for the World Bank.

I am on the 2024-2025 job market and I am available for interviews. Please don’t hesitate to contact me by email below.

Email: chandni [dot] raja [at] gmail [dot] com.

Curriculum Vitae

Publications

[1] How Do Hospitals Respond to Input Regulation? Evidence from the California Nurse Staffing Mandate, Journal of Health Economics, 92, 102826, December 2023

[Paper] [Gated version]

Show Abstract

Abstract: Mandated minimum nurse-to-patient ratios have been the subject of active debate in the U.S. for over twenty years and are under legislative consideration today in several states and at the federal level. This paper uses the 1999 California nurse staffing mandate as an empirical setting to estimate the causal effects of minimum ratios on hospitals. Minimum ratios led to a 58 minute increase in nursing time per patient day and 9 percent increase in the wage bill per patient day in the general medical/surgical acute care unit among treated hospitals. Hospitals responded on several margins: increased their use of lower-licensed and younger nurses, reduced capacity by 16 beds (14 percent), and increased bed utilization rates by 0.045 points (8 percent). Using administrative data on discharges for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), I find a significant reduction in length of stay (5 percent) and no effect on the 30-day all-cause readmission rate. The null effect on readmissions suggests that length of stay declined not because hospitals were discharging AMI patients ``quicker and sicker", rather, AMI patients recovered more quickly due to an improvement in care quality per day.

Job Market Paper

[2] Input Regulation and the Production of Hospital Quality

[Paper]

Show Abstract

Abstract: We have a limited understanding of how nurses, physicians, and patients interact to produce high quality care but these interactions are central to efficient regulatory design. This paper estimates a value-added production model for hospital quality in nurses per patient, physicians per patient, and patient health using identifying variation from the 1999 California nurse staffing mandate -- the first and to date one of few pieces of comprehensive legislation of nurse staffing levels in hospitals. I find nurses and physicians to be highly complementary (near Leontief) in production. I show that minimum nurse-to-patient ratios that do not account for these complementarities increase healthcare labor costs by 1.4 percent holding quality constant amounting to \$24 million in costs across hospitals affected by the mandate. On average, I do not find evidence of across-hospital misallocation of nurses to low productivity hospitals due to ratio regulation -- low staffing hospitals are as productive as their high staffing neighbors -- but I find allocative gains can be made by reallocating nurses to hospitals with higher severity patients where they are more valuable.

Work in Progress

[3] Employer Collusion in Labor Markets. U.S. Census Bureau Special Sworn Status Project (approved 12/09/2022).

[4] Effects of Public Option on Plan Competition and Provider Rate Negotiation (with Nicholas Tilipman and Wesley Yin)

Teaching

Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (Econ 101): Fall 2020 (**winner of Teaching Assistant award), Winter 2024

Organization of Firms (Econ 106I): Winter 2021 (**winner of Teaching Assistant award)

[Full set of teaching evaluations]